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Raymond MacCallum*

The Community-Based
Management of Fisheries
in Atlantic Canada:
A Legislative Proposal

The crises in Canada's fisheries demonstrate the failure of Canadian fisheries
management practices to achieve their public policy objectives. The author
proposes that a new fisheries management regime, based on principles of
community-based management, should be implemented to better ensure the
sustainability of both the fisheries and fishing communities. A draft bill is provided
to establish a specific framework around which to discuss those values and
interests that should be promoted and protected by legislation, and how legislation can be used to establish and nurture a new community-based management
regime.
Les crises v~cues par les p6cheries canadiennes sont la preuve de I'dchec des
pratiques de gestion actuelles a atteindreles objectifs des politiques en matiere
dep~cheries.Cet article propose qu'un nouveau r6gime de gestion des pcheries,
fond6 sur des principes de gestion communautaire, soit implant6 afin d'assurer
un meilleurmaintien des p6cheries et des communaut6s s'y rattachant. Un projet
de loi est propos6 qui fournit un cadre concret a I'interieurduquel peuvent 6tre
discut6s les valeurs et int6r~ts qui devraient 6tre promus et protdges par la
legislation ainsi que la facon dont celle-ci peut 6tre utilis6e afin d'6tablir et de
construire un nouveau r6gime de gestion communautaire.

Introduction
The crisis in Canada's Atlantic fisheries has provided both an opportunity
and a justification for replacing the traditional fisheries management
paradigm. In its stead should be considered an approach that is rooted in
human history at the same time that it is radically new: community-based
management.' The theory and practice of community-based manage-

* Dalhousie Law School, LL.B. 1997. The author was awarded a J.S.D. Tory Writing Award
for an earlier version of this paper and thanks the Toronto firm of Tory Tory Deslauriers &
Binnington for their support of legal research and writing. He would also like to thank David
VanderZwaag and Chris Mclnnis for helpful criticisms.
1. Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs), which have the effect of conferring private rights
to a pre-specified share of the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) on an individual fisher, are also
receiving significant attention as fisheries managers attempt to find solutions to the crises.
However, it is not the purpose of this proposal to debate the merits of ITQs. On ITQs, see
generally, P.A. Neher, R. Arnason & N. Mollett, eds., Rights Based Fishing (Dordrecht:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989).
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ment2 has received significant attention from social scientists,3 as well as
tentative acceptance by legislators and administrators, as a potential
fisheries management tool.4 It is the purpose of this proposal to suggest
that the community-based management of fisheries deserves policy
primacy in Canada, and that this objective can be accomplished in part
through legislative direction and promotion.
The institutionalization of community-based management of fisheries
in Atlantic Canada5 would require a delegation of formal management
responsibilities to local-level fishers' organizations and away from the
Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO). The primary objective of
such a fundamental restructuring of the formal management regime
would be to empower fishers to take stewardship over the resources that
sustain both their livelihoods and their communities. The potential
advantage of a community-based management approach is that by
granting actual and effective decision-making power to the people who
live and work on the seas, who know the fisheries from first-hand

2. The literature discusses both "community-based management" and "co-management,"
sometimes confusing the two, but more often conceiving of them as a continuum of greater or
less user-participation in the actual management of the resource. See, e.g., S. Sen & JR.
Nielsen, "Fisheries Co-management: A Comparative Analysis" (1996) 20 Marine Policy 405
at 406-7, and E. Pinkerton & M. Weinstein, Fisheries that Work: Sustainabiliiy Through
Community-Based Management (Vancouver: The David Suzuki Foundation, 1995) at 11.
For the purposes of this paper and the proposed legislation (see Appendix), the term
"community-based management" will be used. The literature generally reserves the term for
informal management institutions that exist without official government sanction and in the
absence of any governmental support or decision-making input. By this logic, any communitybased management system that received state sanction in the form of legislative protection or
institutionalization would therefore become "co-management". It is preferable, however, to
sustain the emphasis on "community" in a proposal that is designed to give to fishing
communities meaningful responsibilities and an increased capacity for self-determination.
3. See, e.g., Sen & Nielsen, supra note 2; Pinkerton & Weinstein, supranote 2; F.T. Christy,
Territorial Use Rights in Marine Fisheries: Definitions and Conditions. FAO Fisheries
Technical PaperNo. 227 (Rome: FAO, 1982); F. Berkes, ed., Common PropertyResources:
Ecology and Community-Based Sustainable Development (London: Belhaven Press, 1989);
R.S. Pomeroy, "Small-scale fisheries management and development: Towards a communitybased approach" (1991) 15 Marine Policy 39; and S. Jento and B. McCay, "User Participation
in Fisheries Management: Lessons Drawn from International Experiences" (1995) 19 Marine
Policy 227.
4. See, e.g., s. 17 of the proposed FisheriesAct, Bill C-62, An Act Respecting Fisheries, 2d
sess., 35th Parl., 1996 (1st reading 3 October 1996 died on the order paper April 1997); The
FisheriesManagementPartneringConcept:DF0/5362,(Ottawa: DFO, 1996); and Pinkerton
and Weinstein, supra note 2 at 55-62.
5. This proposal is limited to Atlantic Canada because the author's research has focussed on
rectifiying the problems of management in an economy and society highly dependent on
coastal fisheries, and characterized by "inshore" versus "offshore" conflicts. It is hoped that
future discussion might determine the extent to which the legislative proposal can be modified
or expanded to encompass the different management needs of the Pacific fisheries.
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experience, and who depend on the health of the marine environment for
the survival of their individual livelihoods and their collective way of life,
the sustainability of the fisheries and of the fishing communities will be
enhanced.6
What is the role of the law in this process? 7 One of the law's many
purposes is to effect change in the way that society functions by extending
legal protection to new values or interests that have heretofore been
unprotected. In fulfilling this purpose, the law can either react to social
pressures for change, or it can be pro-active in recognizing the need for
change. In formally institutionalizing community-based management of
fisheries, the law would be acting both reactively and pro-actively: some
interest already exists in creating a formal community-based management structure, but the actual taking of legislative initiative should
encourage support for the process from fishers. Establishing a legislative
framework for the operation of community-based management would
allow fishers to envisage the potential results. The fishers would also be
secure in the knowledge that the benefits of any efforts that they expended
in developing an alternative management structure would be protected by
law.
In proposing a Community-Based Management of Fisheries Act
(CBMFA),8 there exists an additional agenda aside from the desire that it
might some day pass into law. Law has a way of focussing the discussion
and narrowing the issues (admittedly, not always a desirable outcome).
A draft CBMFA can hopefully serve this purpose in a milieu in which the
social science has not yet consolidated, and where sophisticated practical
experience in formal community-based management is rare.9 By having

6. J.R. McGoodwin, Crisis in the World's Fisheries: People, Problems, and Policies
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990) at 179. The author notes the general correlation
that fishers enjoying some sort of proprietary rights (control of access) to fisheries, tend
voluntarily to restrain fishing effort in order to sustain the resources. See also CJ.N. Gibbs &
D.W. Bromley, "Institutional Arrangements for Managing Rural Resources: Commonproperty regimes" in F. Berkes, supra note 3, 22 at 29-30.
7. In the "Preface" to a special issue of the DalhousieLaw Journal,entitledAfter the Collapse,
D. Russell and M. McConnell point out that a legal analysis is of the least importance in
explaining the crisis in East Coast fisheries, compared to the perspectives of other disciplines
((1995) 18 Dal. LJ. I at 5). However, the legal perspective does have a significant contribution
to make in preventing any further crises, when it helps to determine which interests and
processes will be promoted and protected by the law.
8. Attached as the Appendix.
9. Some experience does exist in Canada. The Fundy Fixed Gear Council concluded an
agreement with DFO to manage the quota for the hand-line, long-line and gill-net fisheries in
the Bay of Fundy in 1996. See Fundy Fixed Gear Council, 1996 Season Review, Digby.
Extensive experience in community-based management also exists in Japan, where a highly
institutionalized management regime has functioned since the 19th century. But Japan has not
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a concrete and relatively specific framework as a common reference
point, those interested in transforming the management of Canada's
fisheries will be able to test their theories and assumptions against the
CBMFA, and from the discussions, achieve a workable consensus.
This proposal is set out in five parts. First, a brief discussion of the
perceived failures of the dominant fisheries management practices is
undertaken in order to outline the need for reform. Second, the potential
benefits that can be realized for the sustainability of the fisheries and of
fishing communities are described. Third, the essential elements of
historically successful community-based management regimes are outlined. Fourth, the structure and function of the CBMFA are explained.
Finally, the conclusion reiterates the need for a principled, structured yet
flexible approach to the legislative institutionalization of communitybased management of fisheries in Canada.
I. The Need For an Alternative Approach
It is generally recognized that fisheries in Canada and around the world
are in crisis. 0 By implication, the management of those fisheries is
similarly in crisis. That the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO)
has been unsuccessful in its objective to conserve Atlantic Canada's
major fisheries is clear." Beyond the obvious conclusion that overfishing has led to the decline in fish stocks, what is not clear are the root

been emulated to the same degree anywhere else. On the Japanese fisheries management
regime, see generally Yohoji Asada, Yutaka Hirasawa & Fukuzo Nagasaki, FisheryManagement in Japan: FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No. 238 (Rome: FAO, 1983); K. Ruddle,
Administration and Conflict Management in Japanese Coastal Fisheries FAO Fisheries
Technical PaperNo. 273 (Rome: FAO, 1987); and Pinkerton & Weinstein, supra note 2 at 71 98.
10. See, e.g., BJ. McCay & A.C. Finlayson, "The Political Ecology of Crisis and Institutional
Change: The Case of the Northern Cod" (Paper presented to the Annual Meetings of the
American Anthropological Association, Washington, D.C., 15-19 Nov. 1995, at 1); A.C.
Finlayson, Fishingfor Truth:A SociologicalAnalysis of Northern CodStock Assessmentsfrom
1977-1990 (St. John's: Institute of Social and Economic Research, Memorial University of
Newfoundland, 1994) at 6-10; J. Harvey & D. Coon,BeyondCrisis in the Fisheries:A Proposal
for Community-BasedEcologicalFisheriesManagement(Fredericton: Conservation Council
of New Brunswick, 1997) at 4; and P. Weber, Net Loss: Fish, Jobs, and the Marine
Environment (Washington, D.C.: Worldwatch Institute, 1994) at 5-6. See generally,After the
Collapse, supra note 7.
11. See, e.g., M. Sinclair, "Summary of Conclusions of First Scotia-Fundy Groundfish
Workshop" in Report of the Second Workshop on Scotia-Fundy Groundfish Management,
1996, 44 at 47; and R.A. Rogers, The Oceans are Emptying: Fish Wars and Sustainability
(Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1995) at 147-48. See also the general historical decline of most
groundfish stocks as evidenced in the species specific data reproduced in, 1996 Atlantic
Groundfish Management Plan, DF015167.(Ottawa: DFO, 1996).
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causes of that over-fishing. 2 Of critical importance is the relationship
between the science that formed the basis of fisheries management
strategies and the policies that were pursued. Another dynamic to
understand concerns the reasons for, and the extent of, DFO management
bias in favour of offshore, large-scale and corporate-dominated fish
production as opposed to small-scale, inshore fishers.1 3 A final and
related factor in assessing the failure of fisheries management to conserve
the stocks is the lack of legitimacy accorded to DFO policies and
regulations in the fishing communities.
The dominant management perspective since the North Atlantic stock
crises of the 1970s has been based on the concept of the "tragedy of the
commons." 4 The "tragedy of the commons" theory posits that in a
common property resource regime, where there exists unrestricted access
to the resources, the resource-users will act in their individual, economically rational best interests, to exploit the resource as quickly as possible
before it is depleted. The actions of the resource-users are undertaken in
the expectation that everyone else will act in the same way. Individual
behaviour is based on the assumption that each user will maximize
present exploitation efforts in order to secure the greatest benefits from
an inevitably diminishing resource. Total economic and biological deple-

12. Other potential culprits in the crisis in Atlantic fisheries, which will not be discussed here,
have been noted in G.D. Taylor, "The Collapse of the Northern Cod Fishery: A Historical
Perspective" (1995) 18 Dal. LJ. 13 at 14. Taylor relates that blame has been directed at the
foreign fleet by John Crosbie, then Minister of Fisheries and Oceans; fishers have pointed the
finger at the International Fund for Animal Welfare for achieving the cancellation of the seal
hunt, therefore allowing an increase in predation of juvenile cod; DFO scientists have been
blamed for their too optimistic stock assessments following the excitement of the declaration
of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). See also P. Underwood, "To Manage Quotas or
Manage Fisheries? The Root Cause of Mismanagement of Canada's Groundfish Fishery"
(1995) 18 Dal. L.J. 37.
13. The issue as to how to classify fishers as either offshore or inshore, and/or small-scale or
large-scale has received some attention in the literature. For the purposes of this discussion,
inshore/small-scale fishers are generally those who are economically dependent on local
fishing grounds, own and operate their own fishing endeavours, and lack alternative employment or investment opportunities. See T. Panayotou, Management Conceptsfor Small Scale
Fisheries:Economic and Social Aspects: FAO FisheriesTechnical PaperNo. 228 (Rome:
FAO, 1982) at I (footnote 1). See also C. Emery, The NorthernCod crisis:BackgroundPaper
No. BP-313E (Ottawa: Library of Parliament-Research Branch, 1992) at note 6, for a more
specifically technical differentiation between the inshore and offshore fleet, focusing on vessel
size (greater versus smaller than 65 feet).
14. G. Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons" (1968) 162 Science 1243. On the origins and
development of the "tragedy of the commons" bio-economic perspective, and its application
to fisheries management, see D.R. Matthews, Controlling Common Property: Regulating
Canada'sEast Coast Fishery (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993) at 40-47.
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tion of the resource results in the absence of collective action or external
compulsion to prevent it. 5
The acceptance of the "tragedy of the commons" theory by Canadian
fisheries managers led to obvious conclusions about the need to restrain
fishing effort.1 6 As a result, a quota-based management regime was
adopted in order to restrict fishing effort to sustainable levels. 7 The idea
of quota-based management was first employed by the International
Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF), an international organization whose member states had fishing interests in the
Northwest Atlantic. The decreasing economic viability of the Northwest
Atlantic fishery led ICNAF to introduce the concept of an annual Total
Allowable Catch (TAC) for a given species, subdivided into a further
quota for each member state restricting the amount of fish its nationals
could harvest. 8 After the establishment of the 200-mile limit, and the
creation of Canadas new exclusive fisheries zone in 1977, Canadian
fisheries managers adopted TAC as a management tool and established
quotas for each targeted species. 19

15. See K. Kuperan & Nik Mustapha Raja Abdullah, "Small-scale Coastal Fisheries and
Co-management" (1994) 18 Marine Policy 306 at 308.
16. C. Emery, Quota Licensing in Canadas Fishing Industry: Background Paper No. BP344E, (Ottawa: Library of Parliament- Research Branch, 1993) at 3, notes the acceptance by
Canadian fisheries managers of the tragedy of the commons perspectve in 1976, as evidenced
in a policy paper of the then Department of Fisheries and the Environment, Policy ForCanadas
CommercialFisheries(Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1976). He cites p. 39 of the paper for the
declaration that:
[T]he central problem of the ground fisheries is rooted in a conflict between individual
interests and a collective interest.... In an open-access, free for all fishery, competing
fishermen try to catch all of the fish available to them regardless of the consequences,
unless they are checked; the usual consequence is a collapse of the fishery: that is
resource extinction in the commercial sense, repeating in a fishery context "the tragedy
of the commons."
17. The United Nations Law of the Sea Convention, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122 (1982),
reproduced in 21 I.L.M. 1261 [hereinafter LOSC], article 61 (1) requires that all coastal states
establish TACs, in order to achieve the management objective of maximum sustainable yield
(MSY) (article 61(3)).
18. See C. Emery, Overfishing Outside the 200-mile Limit: Atlantic Coast: Current Issue
Review No. 90-60E (Ottawa: Library of Parliament-Research Branch, 1996) at 3.
19. R.G.Halliday, F.G. Peacock & D.L. Burke, "Development of Management Measures for
the Groundfish Fishery in Atlantic Canada" (1992) 16 Marine Policy 411 at 414. Explaining
that TAC was developed by the International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
(ICNAF) in 1972, to obtain the objective of MSY, is MJ. Kirby,NavigatingTroubled Waters:
A New Policy for the Atlantic Fisheries (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1983) at 17.
Finally, J. Gough, "A Historical Sketch of Fisheries Management in Canada," in L. S. Parsons
& W.H. Lear, eds., Perspectives on Canadian Marine Fisheries Management: Canadian
Bulletin ofFisheriesandAquaticSciences 226 (Ottawa: National Research Council of Canada,
1993) at 40, notes that MSY was replaced by optimum sustainable yield (OSY) as the objective

The Community-Based Management of Fisheries in Atlantic Canada

In theory, TAC is established in accordance with the scientific estimate, expressed in tonnes, of the total surplus of fish that the industry can
catch in a given year without jeopardizing the ability of the fisheries to
maintain themselves perpetually .20 Ideally, the industry is prevented from
exceeding the TACs through regulation. It is a simple bio-economic
model that, with hind-sight and a deeper understanding and awareness of
the complexity of marine ecosystems, can be condemned as simple to a
fault.
A misplaced faith in the ability of science to explain our complex
world, and to do so in a utilitarian and cost-effective manner, seems to
have contributed to the crisis.2' Fisheries managers require a tool that is
consistent with economic concepts such as "production surpluses,"
"catch per unit of effort" and "volume throughput." Conceptually, quotabased management serves the needs of fisheries managers. However, the
practical limits of scientific knowledge and ability mean that the value of
the recommended quotas on which TACs are based, is seriously overrated. 2 These limitations put into doubt whether single-species quota
management has any utilitarian value at all as a management tool in an
ecosystem as complicated as the Northwest Atlantic Ocean, 3 and in an
industry as diffuse and difficult to regulate as the fishing industry.
Multiple sources of error exist that diminish the value of quota
management .24 First, recommended quotas are based on estimates of the
total biomass of a given species of fish, combined with considerations of
natural mortality, science's imperfect understanding of recruitment rates,
and the stock abundance required for species sustainability. The assessof TACs. OSY represents a blend of biological and economic considerations of stability and
predictability.
20. R.A. Rogers, supra note 11, at 18 argues the common sense position that it is a fallacy of
economics that it presumes that nature will produce an exploitable surplus each year.
21. G.D. Taylor, supra note 12, at 18-19, explains that there is a gap between the public's
perception of science, and DFO's actual capacity to understand fish population dynamics and
mathematical modelling.
22. Finlayson,supra note 10 at 149, quotes a senior DFO scientist commenting on economic
management tools: "All our forecasting tools... are flawed in some fundamental way, and not
only do we not understand how they are flawed, we are not even seeing the general pattern."
And yet, note McCay & Finlayson,supra note 10 at 8, science maintains its legitimacy because
it "is so firmly established and deeply rooted in society's consciousness as the well of certified
knowledge and objective authority that it will take more and larger ecological crises than
simply the collapse of a few fish stocks to seriously destabilize its authority."
23. Noting the multi-faceted difficulties of managing complex ecosystems for fisheries
sustainability is S.M. Garcia, The PrecautionaryApproach to Fisheries with Reference to
StraddlingFish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: FAO FisheriesCircularNo. 871
(Rome: FAO, 1994) at 4-5.
24. Ibid. See also Harvey & Coon, supra note 10, at 6-9, and; Finlayson, supra note 10,
at 33-35.
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ment takes place on a species-by-species basis, largely in ignorance of the
impacts of interdependencies with other species and their fluctuations.25
More general ecosystem variations, such as water temperature and
marine pollution, are also poorly understood in terms of their effects on
It does not appear that
stock abundance, recruitment and mortality rates .26
fisheries and marine science has yet achieved a level of sophistication
where it can estimate stock abundance and surplus with sufficient
reliability .27
The quality of the recommended quotas on which TACs are based is
also dependent on an accurate appreciation of catch-related mortality.
However, in an industry in which misreporting of landings and discarding
are rational strategies to avoid quota limits ,21 the quality of data collected
by DFO scientists to input into the TAC estimating formula is significantly suspect.2 9 The representativeness of the data that forms the basis
of TAC calculations is also an issue. °DFO scientists have demonstrated
a traditional bias towards data accumulated from the catch levels of largescale, offshore vessels, while failing to systematically integrate stock
abundance and behaviourial observations from the inshore fisheries and

25. P. Underwood, supra note 12, at 39, suggests that "linear equilibrium models, based on
questionable data and mistaken assumptions as to the critical and dynamic variables of
recruitment and natural mortality, have proven to be incapable of simulating the complexities
of a fisheries ecosystem." See also, Harvey & Coon, supra note 10, at 7.
26. Ibid., Harvey & Coon.
27. Finlayson, supra note 10,at 154, suggests that science does not have now, and never will
have, sufficient information to achieve a consensus on scientifically based fisheries management. The only alternative, he suggests, is to manage the fishery from a sociological
perspective, i.e., managing people, not fish. See also L.S. Parsons & W.H. Lear, "History and
Management of the Fishery for Northern Cod in NAFO Divisions 2J, 3K and 3L", in L.S.
Parsons & W.H. Lear, supra note 19, 55 at 86.
S.M. Garcia, supra note 23, at 5 states a truism when he notes that the cost of obtaining
sufficiently complete data concerning marine ecosystem behaviour and relations would be
uneconomical. He advocates a precautionary approach to fisheries management to take
account of the uncertainty. See also Harvey & Coon, supra note 10, at 9.
28. Underwood, supra note 12 at 39.
29. Sinclair, supra note 11 at 44-45; J.G. Leefe, "The Groundfishery in Crisis: A Personal
Snapshot" (1995) 18 Dal. LJ.23, at 27. See generally D.L. Alverson et al.A GlobalAssessment
of Fisheries Bycatch and Discards: FAO Fisheries Technical PaperNo. 339 (Rome: FAO,
1994).
30. A. T. Charles, "The Atlantic Canadian Groundfishery: Roots of a Collapse" (1995) 18
Dal. LJ.65 at 80, explains that the data upon which DFO relies is suspect because it relies on
non-comprehensive, research data gathered only from offshore trawling, as well as catch
reports from the offshore sector. The catch "success" reports are suspect as indicators of stock
abundance because the technology employed by this sector would allow the vessels to find even
the last fish in the ocean.
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fishers.3' This leads to a less than comprehensive understanding of stock
32
levels and impairs the accuracy of stock assessments .
Finally, the actual TACs adopted by DFO for a given annual management plan may not represent the scientists' recommendations.33 Policymakers understand that TAC is only an estimate of the surplus stock. They
understand that there are many variables that cannot be accurately
quantified and that may possibly disguise greater stock abundance.
Therefore, taking a risk by adopting a higher TAC than the recommendation is often justified for political reasons.34 In fact, the "interpretive
flexibility" of the data led to frequent inflation of TACs above the
recommended quota for Atlantic groundfish stocks between 1977 and
1992.31
In addition to the discounting of inshore fishers' knowledge and
experience for the purpose of stock assessments, there exists further
dissonance between the dominant management paradigm and the management needs of inshore fishers.36 As previously discussed, the guiding

31. See Finlayson, supra note 10 at 105. See also Pinkerton & Weinstein, supra note 2 at
2-3, who identify as one of the "Nine Great Socio-Political Problems in Fisheries Management" the undervaluing of fishers' knowledge by government managers.
32. McCay & Finlayson,supra note 10 at 7, explain how the reluctance of DFO to collect and
assess inshore fisheries data led to an overestimation of stock abundance by almost 100 percent
and fishing mortality by 50 percent in 1989, despite appeals by inshore fishers.
33. Even the scientists' methodology and practice cannot be described as risk averse,
however. A.T. Charles, supra note 30 at 71-72, explains that the presumption of a constant
recruitment rate in estimating FO.1 (the formula to set TACs) instead of developing a method
to investigate more accurate recruitment rates, combined with a refusal to make systematic
down-ward adjustments of total biomass due to by-catch, illegal catch and discarding, indicates
that the only risks that DFO were avoiding were foregone economic benefits.
34. Even the Harris Report (L. Harris, Independent Review of the State of the Northern Cod
Stock (Ottawa: Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 1990)), which reviewed DFO's Northern
Cod assessments for the 1980s, and concluded that they were all inflated, recommended a
higher than biologically ideal TAC due to the potential socio-economic ramifications of a too
drastically reduced quota. See Finlayson, supra note 10 at 80, and; A.T. Charles, supra note
30 at 75. Charles also explains at 74, that DFO followed the "50% rule" whereby a
recommendation to reduce a TAC in a given year because of lower stock levels would only be
heeded by 50 percent of the recommended reduction, in order to alleviate the socio-economic
disruption of the adjustment.
The pressure on DFO to make Nature conform to the economic needs of the fishing
industry, is implicit in the following quotation from National Sea President, Henry Demone:
"Our philosophy in the early 1990s was that we couldn't just sit here and explain to our brokers
and shareholders: 'Well, the quota went down again and the fishing was bad and I'm sorry.'
They don't take that for an answer." (The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (13 May 1997).
35. Sinclair, supra note II, at 45, and; Finlayson, supra note 10, at 74.
36. See Harvey and Coon, supra note 10, at 27.
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principle of Canadian fisheries management (and indeed state-controlled
fisheries management around the world)37 is the need to control fishing
effort, in order to avoid the "tragedy of the commons."" The "tragedy of
the commons" concept presumes a homogeneity of economically rational behaviour by every fisher operating in a common property regime.39
The presumption has led DFO to treat all fishers with the same rules, and
all fishing areas as open-access, common property subject to a uniform
management regime .' This management regime may be appropriate for
offshore, corporate-dominated fishing operations, but arguably has the
effect of undermining the small-scale fishers and their presumptively
more sustainable relationship to the fishery. 41 One has to question
whether overall management measures can be successful when they do
not accord with the reality and needs of small-scale fishers.
It has been persuasively asserted that successful fisheries management
is mostly about managing the fishers, not the fish.42 The real nature of
inshore fisheries demands such an approach. An abundance of case
studies and literature from around the world demonstrates that the smallscale fisher does not necessarily act as a rapacious, profit-maximizing,

37. See also D.M. Johnston, "Stresses and Mind-sets in Fishery Management" (1995) 18 Dal.
LJ.154 at 158, who criticizes the inflexibility of LOSC obligations under article 61, discussed
supra, in footnote 17, and its inconsistency with the need for local level adjustment in order to
produce effective management.
38. Fishing effort is controlled by various management and regulatory tools, depending on
the species and the sector, in order to ensure respect for TACs. Management tools include the
use of input/effort controls, such as restrictions on the mesh size of fishing nets, restrictions on
the size of vessels, or the use of controls such as area closures, seasonal openings and "days at
sea" limitations.
39. R.S. Pomeroy, supra note 3 at 45, advocates the need for a community-based management approach to take account of the sociological diversity of fishers.
40. Noting the inappropriateness of homogeneous treatment is A. Davis, "Property Rights
and Access Management in the Small Boat Fishery: A Case Study From Southwest Nova
Scotia", in C. Lamson & AJ. Hanson, eds., Atlantic Fisheries and Coastal Communities:
Fisheries Decision-Making Case Studies (Halifax: Dalhousie Ocean Studies Programme,
1984) at 155. R.A. Rogers, supra note 11 at 48, argues that government policy belittled the
inshore sector as "dated," "backwards," and an impediment to modernization.
See also D.R. Matthews, supra note 14, at 92-93 who posits that the root of the dissonance
between government and inshore views of the fishery, lies in the government's belief in its
ownership in the fish (on behalf of the public) whereas the fishers believe they have a
"property" right in their local fishing territory.
41. R.A. Rogers, supra note 11, at 52-3.
42. See Pinkerton & Weinstein, supra note 2 at 1. Pinkerton and Weinstein note that the
Japanese management system rarely calculates or relies on TAC, ibid. at 71-2. Instead, Japan
has created the most highly institutionalized system for participatory decision-making and
community-based management of fisheries in the world, as well as one of the most successful
fishing industries in the world. See also Jentoft & McCay,supranote 3 at 227, and; K. Kuperan
& Nik Mustapha Raja Abdullah, supra note 15 at 306.
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market-economic actor. 43 To the contrary, many informal, communitybased management practices have existed to successfully regulate for
appropriate objectives: the promotion of equitable use of the fisheries,
and resource and community sustainability."
The fact of the fishers' economic dependence on limited local fishing
grounds,' the absence of alternative livelihoods, the desire to maintain a
particular way of life and tradition, and a recognition of responsibilities
to each other and to the community, have often led to the development
over generations of highly particularized community-based management
rules .46 In contexts where community-based management of fisheries has
developed, the rules invariably control access to fishing grounds, usually
excluding non-community members. 47 They also often involve gear
restrictions, closed-areas and seasons, and equitable mechanisms for
sharing the most productive fishing grounds .48 The rules in these communities have legitimacy because they serve the fishers' dual and interrelated management objectives of sustaining the fisheries and, as a result,
ensure the continued well-being of the fishing communities.a
These informal management rules, and the community efforts to
enforce them, are based on the communities' beliefs in their "ownership"
of the fishing areas that they use. A combination of geographic proximity
to, historical use of, and economic dependency on the fishery leads to the
development of a collective belief in a right to manage the local fisheries
for the benefit of the community, and to the exclusion of outsiders .0
Contrary to this view, DFO management policy and regulations in
Atlantic Canada conceive of most fisheries as the common property of all
natural and legal Canadians, and enforce open-access to those fisheries
for all license-holders, without regard to community dependencies and

43. See, e.g., K. Kuperan and Nik Mustapha Raja Abdullah,supra note 15 at 311; DJ.Doulman,
"Community-based Fishery Management: Towards the Restoration of Traditional Practices in
the South Pacific" (1993), 17 Marine Policy 108; S. Sen & J.R. Nielsen,supra note 2; Pinkerton
& Weinstein, supra note 2 at 24-32; Davis,supranote 40; K. Ruddle,A Guide to the Literature
on TraditionalCommunity-based Fishery Management in the Asia-Pacific Tropics: FAO
FisheriesCircularNo. 869 (Rome: FAO, 1994), and; D.R. Matthews,supra note 14 at 95-137.
44. For a contrary perspective on small-scale fishers' behaviour, see R.S. Pomeroy, supra
note 3 at 40-41.
45. Pinkerton & Weinstein, supra note 2 at 179.
46. See, e.g., J.R. McGoodwin, supra note 6 at 140.
47. See, e.g., F.T. Christy, supra note 3 at 5.
48. DJ. Doulman, supra note 43 at 111.
49. K. Kuperan & Nik Mustapha Raja Abdullah, supra note 15 at 310.
50. A. Davis,supra note 40 at 145.
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historical ties." By enacting regulations that are inconsistent with smallscale fishers' perceived needs,52 and by attempting to enforce a regime
upon fishers that does not represent their economic and social reality,
DFO cannot hope to achieve "buy-in." The contempt and animosity often
directed towards DFO scientists and managers by fishers is plainly
evident.53 The predictable result is that the policies and regulations
promulgated to manage the resources have little or no legitimacy with the
people whose activities they are designed to control. Not only are the
regulations based upon science and data largely developed without the
benefit of significant input of fishers' knowledge and observation, but
they are also predicated on management concepts that arguably are alien
to a large part of the fishing industry.
II. The Promise of Community-Based Management
The basic theory of community-based management of fisheries can be
explained in terms as simple as the dominant bio-economic management
model pursued by DFO: the actual people who depend on the fisheries for
their own livelihood and the social and economic maintenance of their
communities are responsible for collectively and cooperatively making,
implementing and enforcing the rules necessary to manage the fisheries
in order to achieve resource sustainability. At a superficial level of
analysis, the state-centred command and control model of management
shares the same conservation objective with community-based management. However, fundamental differences between the two approaches lie
in their respective loci of decision-making, in whose primary interests the
decisions will be made, their competing views of human nature, and the
management tools upon which these competing views rely.

51. DFO does take into account proximity of the particular fishery resource and the economic
dependence of coastal communities on that fishery, in allocating TAC as between sectors: see
DFO's 1996 Atlantic Groundfish Management Plan, supra note II at 41. But this does not
address the need of fishing communities to exclude outsiders from upsetting the equitable
distribution of local fishing privileges, or the need to establish fishing effort controls within
local fishing grounds, which serve the sustainability objectives of communities.
52. See, e.g., D.R. Matthews, supra note 14 at 154.
53. J.R. McGoodwin, supranote 6 at 77, notes that "At best, many fishers perceive fisheries
scientists and managers as meddlesome people with whom they must cooperate; at worst, they
see them as arrogant and insensitive bureaucrats who have the power to implement arbitrary
and decidedly prejudicial fisheries regulations." Davis, supra note 40 at 133, states that "[i]t
is almost an understatement to suggest that small boat, independent fishermen often perceive
the federal government and the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) as adversaries and
oppressors, i.e., unfamiliar but powerful outsiders forcing them to conform to sets of rules
which make it more difficult to earn a living from fishing." See also Finlayson, supra note 10
at 103.
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The traditional fisheries management paradigm has long presumed
that the fishing industry is largely composed of highly independent and
individualized profit maximizers, and it designs its rules and regulations
based on this presumption. Community-based management contrarily
presumes that small-scale fishers, in particular, are tied to their fishing
communities and define their self-interest, to a certain extent, in terms of
the best interests of those communities. It is not the purpose of this
proposal to resolve the endless debate over humanitys fundamental
nature. But the peculiar blend of self-interest and community interest that
community-based management relies upon has generally led us, as a
society, to establish democratic decision-making processes at all levels of
society in order to govern ourselves. Conceived in this way, the community-based management of fisheries is entirely consistent with Canadian
social values for democratic, participatory self-governance, and cannot
be discounted as a concept that subordinates the individual to the
community. However, it is recognized that it is a legitimate issue for
public debate whether, and to what extent, fishing communities possess
the appropriate socio-cultural values and capacity for responsible selfgovernance.
As a preliminary clarification, community-based management of
fisheries does not necessarily imply the recognition of rights of ownership by a given community over a share of fish or an area of the sea.' The
distinction is about jurisdiction, not ownership. Community-based management is about who has the management responsibilities to decide the
who, what, where, when and how of fishing. In practice, the difference
may appear to be more semantic than real, but in law semantics are often
determinative.55 The characterization of community-based management
as "public" management, but at a lower level of decision-making, and
serving different public interests than state-centred management, is
appropriate .56
What can be gained by locating decision-making authority in the
community? In general, the potential gains can be characterized as
improving the particularization of the management rules, the legitimacy
of the management regime and, as a result, the achievement of the

54. Although, as noted by A.P. Lino Grima & F. Berkes in "Natural Resources: Access,
Rights to Use and Management," in F. Berkes, supra note 3 at 33, community resource use
rights can be characterized as proprietary even if they do not connote "ownership," as the
community has some of the incidents of property ownership, such as a fight of exclusion and
access control.
55. For example, in the absence of ownership rights, a community would not be able to
alienate its rights to fish, or to a fishing area.
56. Harvey & Coon, supra note 10, at 45.
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management objectives (the sustainability of the community and the
fisheries).
As discussed previously, DFO science has collected most of its data
from offshore fishing operations, and this data has been used to formulate
the policies and regulations that have structured the fishing industry . In
a complex ecosystem with multiple interacting and interdependent species, subject to various human pressures from pollution to predation, the
blunt instrument of single-species quota management so far has proven
ineffective in meeting the dual biological and social objectives of
fisheries management.58 However, communities have demonstrated that
they have the capacity to develop management rules that meet the
particular needs of the individual communities and sustain the fisheries
on which they rely.59 Generations of accumulated knowledge of the
behaviour of fisheries at the local level cannot be discounted as backwards, out-dated, or irrelevant.' Locating formal management authority
in fishing communities would allow the legitimation of such expertise, as
it would become the central source of knowledge for the development and
6
justification of management rules. '
In addition to elevating the status and utility of local knowledge,
community-based management would allow greater particularization of
the rules to the local fisheries. 62 DFO management is responsive to the
scale requirements of its entire jurisdiction, which generally means that
it attempts to enforce gear selectivity rules, seasonal closures, and quotas
on entire sectors and North Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO)

57. With the creation of the Fisheries Research Council of Canada in 1992 (see Fisheries
Resource Conservation Council:Building Partnershipsin Resource Conservation(Ottawa:
DFO, 1994)) the data input into the management decision-making formula is no longer as
myopic. However the management model still rests on the questionable ability of science to
be able to accurately determine surplus biomass for a given species.
58. The Canadian Council of Professional Fish Harvesters, A Discussion Paperon Sections
17-21 of Bill C-62: The New FisheriesAct, (Ottawa: The Council, 1997) at 1, only identifies
the maximization of economic returns and social benefits as the central objectives of federal
fisheries policy. However, it cannot be denied that conservation, no matter how poorly
accomplished, has always been an at least an implied objective of fisheries management.
59. See note 43.
60. For a view of a DFO scientist on traditional fishers' knowledge, see, e.g., Finlayson, supra
note 10 at 109-10.
61. It is not being suggested that science would cease to play a role, but merely that in a
community-based management system, it would not have a monopoly on "objectivity."
McCay & Finlayson, supra note 10 at 1, suggest that "participatory research" between
community-based management groups and scientists, implying collaboration and mutual
respect for each's way of knowing, is an appropriate approach.
62. See K. Ruddle, "Solving the Common Property Dilemma: Village Fisheries Rights in
Japanese Coastal Waters" in F. Berkes, supra note 3, 168 at 172, who describes the
management responsibilities of Japanese locally-based Fisheries Cooperative Associations.
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Fishing Areas. These rules may be inappropriate for some local fisheries,
as well as in conflict with effective local practices.63 Further, the rules are
relatively inflexible, developed in a context divorced from the community and non-responsive to local concerns.' Locating decision-making
authority in the community ensures that the management rules reflect
local concerns, and can be altered as those needs and concerns require.
Of paramount importance to the small-scale fishers is their reliance on
multiple species to earn a living. 65 Dependent on near-shore resources,
due to gear and vessel-type, small-scale fishers need to be able to harvest
whatever commercial species exist within their reach. The licensing
requirements and quota allocations by individual species for large areas
of the sea are often insensitive to the small-scale fishers' organizational
and resource needs. 66 Community-based management would allow the
rules on access to, and distribution of, particular species to be tailored to
the socio-economic needs of the local community.
Another benefit of community-based management of fisheries is that,
at least at the local level, there is a "closed loop" between decisions, their
effects and the knowledge and information required to inform the
decisions. 67 The decision-makers are the same people who provide the
knowledge and gather the information that forms the basis of the
decisions. They are also the same people who experience the effects of
these decisions on their activities and observe the impacts of the decisions
on the fisheries. The potential for detailed management rules, flexible
adjustments and continuous feedback of actions and effects 68 can only be
economically realized at the community level.
Another key to the success of community-based management rests
with the legitimacy of the management regime. 69 Where every fisher in

63. See, e.g., A. Davis, supra note 40 at 155-8.
64. Ibid. at 154-5.
65. T. Panayotou, supra note 13 at 22.
66. See, e.g., Fundy Fixed Gear Council, supra note 9 at 9, where multiple species, fixed-gear
fishers were unable to fish their fair share of hake and halibut, because the entire TAC had been
externally harvested for those species prior to when the Fundy fishers usually fish for hake and
halibut.
67. The local scale would avoid the problem, identified by Pinkerton and Weinstein, supra
note 2, at 2-3, of undervaluing and ignoring local knowledge, which leads to management
measures based on incomplete data.
68. McCay & Finlayson, supra note 10 at 1. In this way, community-based management is
consistent with the need for "adapative management" to take account of scientific uncertainty
and variable management needs. See also A.T. Charles, supra note 30 at 75.
69. On the legitimacy of management rules generally, see Pinkerton & Weinstein, supra note
2 at 4-5.
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the community has contributed to the development of the rules through
a participatory decision-making institution, the decision-makers are both
the subjects and the beneficiaries of the decisions. The rules are designed
by the participants to ensure the collective well-being of the community
with which the fishers identify their self-interest. The individual fisher
then supports the management rules because he/she has had a meaningful
voice in the development of those rules.7 0 Fishers comply with the rules
because they have already accepted the efficacy of those rules in achieving the collectively determined management objectives. 7'
Additional pressures for compliance with community-made management rules are rooted in the social dynamic of communities. Theoretically, as a member of a community that has collective control over its
endeavours and aims to achieve its objectives in the best interests of all
of its members, an individual fisher experiences substantial peer pressure
to comply with the rules. Breaking community rules is considered to be
theft from neighbours and a threat to the sustainability of the community
and the fisheries .72 Given the greater identification of the fishers with the
management regime and its objectives, the fishers should each become
monitors and enforcers of the rules. The facility for enforcement and
monitoring is also simplified by its relatively local basis. As "outsiders"
are excluded from fishing within a community's jurisdiction, there is
greater awareness amongst the community of each other's fishing activities and practices.73
III. The Elements of Community-Based Management
What are the essential elements of a sustainable community-based
fisheries management regime? These will be briefly outlined below and
will receive greater attention in the explanation of the CBMFA (Part IV).

70. See, e.g., S. Jentoft & T. Kristofferson, "Fishermen's Co-management: The Case of the
Lofoten Fishery" (1989) 48 Human Organization 355 at 362.
71. D.J. Doulman, supra note 43 at 113.
72. See, e.g,, DJ. Doulman, supra note 43 at 110, where he characterizes a breach of
traditional community rules as tantamount to denying' future generations their resource,
heritage and birthright. Arguably, a breach of DFO regulations is considered in a different light.
Where DFO regulations are considered arbitrary and illegitimate, little or no condemnation is
likely to be forthcoming from a fisher's community. A.T. Charles, supra note 30 at 68, even
suggests that peer pressure operates to the opposite effect with DFO regulations. Fishers are
encouraged to break regulations in order to "beat the system" and maximize profits.
73. Pinkerton & Weinstein, supra note 2 at 6.
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A community-based management regime should have a defined territory over which it can exercise exclusive jurisdiction 7 4 with concordant
rights to control access to fisheries and effort." It should have the ability
to determine the conditions for membership, and should possess the
means to enforce the specified rights and duties of membership .76 The
rights of membership must be non-transferable, to ensure that the resource rights stay within the community, serving the community's
interests and subject to the community's control. 77 The benefits of
membership should be equitably determined and distributed, in order to
maintain widespread support for the management regime, and to protect
its continued legitimacy.78
In a successful community-based management regime, the community tends to have a relationship of geographical proximity, historical use,
and dependency on the area of the sea over which it is exercising
managementjurisdiction 79 These conditions provide circumstantial guarantees of the community's commitment to the sustainability of the
fisheries. The community also needs to have the ability to influence
fishing activities that occur outside its jurisdiction, either in adjacent
communities or offshore, in order to prevent the dissipation of the
benefits of its management efforts . The obvious reason for this is that
community-based management cannot survive if, for instance, offshore
trawlers or adjacent communities can intercept and deplete a migrating
stock before it enters a community's territory.
The decision-making process must be participatory, enlisting knowledge input from all of its members, and receiving in return respect for the
institutions and rules.8' In theory, this ensures that everyone believes that
74. E.P. Durrenberger & G. Pdlsson, "Ownership at Sea: Fishing Territories and Access to
Sea Resources" (1987) 14 Am. Ethnologist 508 at 509, note that Japanese Fisheries Cooperative Associations exercise exclusive jurisdiction over a specific area of the sea. The authors also
comment on the similarity of Japanese and Canadian inshore fisheries practices and behaviour,
despite the legal distinctions between the two "property" regimes. Arguably, this is an
indication of the compatibility of Canadian fisheries management with community control.
75. See, e.g., F.T. Christy, supra note 3 at 5; Pinkerton & Weinstein, supra note 2 at 6. See
also R. Hannesson, Studies on the Role of Fishermen'sOrganizationsin FisheriesManagement: FAO Fisheries Technical PaperNo. 300 (Rome: FAO, 1982) at 4, who points out that
there is a political advantage to conferring on fishers' organizations the unenviable responsibility for equitably determining access rights to the fisheries.
76. The enforcement of rights and duties of membership can occur either through civil
contract (i.e., agreement amongst all the members), or through legislative enforcement, or
through both.
77. Harvey & Coon,supranote 10 at 47.
78. See, e.g., Jentoft & Kristofferson, supra note 70 at 362.
79. A. Davis, supra note 40 at 141. See also Pinkerton & Weinstein, supra note 2 at 179.
80. F.T. Christy, supra note 3 at 5; Pinkerton & Weinstein, supra note 2 at 186.
81. See, e.g., Jentoft & Kristofferson, supra note 70 at 362-363.
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they have an ability to influence the rules, as well as a stake in the
observance of those rules. Legitimacy will also be enhanced where there
is sufficient consensus on the primary objectives of the management
regime, and the tools used to accomplish those objectives.82 Without a
"community of interest" on objectives and methods, the management
regime will not enjoy sufficient legitimacy to guarantee compliance with
the rules.83

Even with democratic input and sufficient consensus, the community
must also exhibit a willingness for self-monitoring and enforcement." An
important part of the legitimacy and effectiveness of community-based
management is rooted in peer pressure85 and the belief in the protection
of collective interests.86 The fear of social condemnation is a powerful
tool to ensure conformity with social norms.
Finally, legislative sanction for the community's jurisdiction offers a
guarantee that the benefits flow to the community members, thus encouraging "buy-in" and support for the process.87 Additionally, formal institutionalization enlists the law to defend the physical boundaries of the
management area88 without need of extra-legal measures.89
A condition that suggests the appropriateness of community-based
management is a community's economic, social and cultural dependence
on local fisheries. 9° This implies both a lack of alternative employment
opportunities for community members, and a high degree of vulnerability
to the non-sustainable use of the fisheries. A strong commitment to, and
identification with, the community by individual fishers is also a factor
favourable to successful community-based management. 9' These condi-

82. K. Kuperan & Nik Mustapha Raja Abdullah, supra note 15 at 310.
83. For instance if a community is divided between those who are intent on racing to fish
every last fish in the sea, and those interested in sustaining the resource and the community,
it is unlikely that community-based management will be successful.
84. Pinkerton & Weinstein, supra note 2 at 10.
85. See R.S. Pomeroy, supra note 3 at 46.
86. Whether community-based management entails the collective protection of collectively
defined interests, or whether it is a rational individual response to economic and biological
resource scarcity is unclear. To the extent that it is in an individual's personal, social, cultural
and economic self interest to belong to a community, and that that community's approbation
demands cooperative behaviour, the distinction is academic.
87. J.R. McGoodwin, supra note 6 at 141.
88. Jentoft and McCay, supra note 3 at 516.
89. For example, cutting off the gear of outsiders: see, e.g., Davis, supra note 40 at 147; or
threats of physical violence: see, e.g. Pinkerton & Weinstein, supra note 2 at 27.
90. Pinkerton & Weinstein, supra note 2 at 179, Harvey & Coon, supra note 10 at 30.
91. Pinkerton & Weinstein, supra note 2 at 185.
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tions act to encourage the sustainable use of the fisheries in order to
preserve individual livelihoods and community well-being. 92
IV. An Act Respecting the Community-Based
Management of Fisheries

The impetus for proposing the Community-Based Management of Fisheries Act comes in part from the federal government's weak and potentially dangerous attempt at legislating to allow community-based management. Section 17 of a proposed new FisheriesAct which was introduced
in October 1996, but whose fate is now uncertain after it died on the order
paper in April 1997 would have given authority to the Minister of
Fisheries and Oceans to enter into legally binding "fisheries management
agreements" with fishers' organizations.9 3 On one hand, this is a positive
indication of the government's acceptance of the concept of communitybased management as a fisheries management tool. However, the content
of section 17 was inadequate to ensure the conclusion of effective or
equitable fisheries management agreements with community-based fisheries organizations. If s. 17 is re-introduced as is, its structural and
substantive weakness portends an ad hoc and unprincipled approach to

92. Pinkerton & Weinstein, supra note 2 at 182, emphasize that an important component of
community-based management is the notion that the community is managing the resource as
much to preserve it for future generations as it is to derive present benefits.
93. Section 17 of the proposed FisheriesAct, The House of Commons, Bill C-62, First
reading Oct. 3, 1996, reads as follows:
17.

(1) Her Majesty in right of Canada, represented by the Minister, may enter into a
fisheries management agreement with any organization that, in the opinion of
the Minister, is representative of a class of person or holders.
(2) An agreement may establish
(a) the harvest limits, and other conservation and management measures for a
fishery;
(b) the number of licences that may be issued for the class of holders or person;
(c) the fees payable to Her Majesty in right of Canada with respect to the
issuance of the licences and the variation or rescission of, or addition to,
conditions of the licences;
(d) the obligations, responsibilities and funding arrangements with respect to
management of the fishery; and
(f) conservation and management programs for the fishery.
(3) An Agreement may, for the purposes of Part III, establish guidelines for use
by a Tribunal on allowing a proceeding with respect to a major violation.
(4) It is a condition of any licence issued for fishing in a fishery to which a fisheries
management agreement applies that the conservation and management measures set out in the agreement be complied with.
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the delegation of DFO's management responsibilities.9 4 A few criticisms
of section 17 therefore are warranted.
First, section 17 leaves everything up to ministerial discretion. There
are no enumerated criteria that an interested organization must meet other
than that it must be, in the Minister's opinion, "representative of a class
of persons or holders." There are no safeguards against the conclusion of
a fisheries management agreement that has the effect of "rationalizing"
the industry to the exclusion of fishers not members of the "representative" organization. Neither are there guidelines to ensure that a fisheries
management agreement is consistent with overall conservation or socioeconomic objectives. Accordingly, it is recommended that section 17 in
its proposed form should not be included in any new FisheriesAct.
Alternatively, the proposed Community-Based Management of Fisheries Act attempts to set out a more comprehensive legislative approach.
It is hoped that the proposed structure and content of the CBMFA would
lead to the development of a principled and effective process to delegate
real management authority to fishing industry stakeholders. In particular,
and in contrast to section 17 of the proposed FisheriesAct, the CBMFA
would necessitate the firm acceptance of a legislated policy bias in favour
of inshore fisheries and small-scale fishers. Where the dominant management methods that led to the present fisheries crisis were based on topdown management practices attuned to the reality and needs of largescale offshore operators, the CBMFA would be grounded at the community
level. The other industry interests would have to be accommodated only
to the extent that their operations were consistent with the interests of
small-scale inshore fishers.
As a preliminary note to the explanation of the CBMFA, it is important
to recognize that it was developed presupposing the enactment of a new
FisheriesAct. It is intended that the two Acts would co-exist. However,
whether a new Fisheries Act comes into law, the CBMFA would be
complementary.
The following discussion is not designed to offer a comprehensive
overview of the operation of the CBMFA, but rather to comment selectively on some of its highlights, and some of its less self-explanatory
provisions. It is hoped that the CBMFA can speak for itself with regard to
its structure and function, as well as the administrative scheme that it
envisages. Important details have been ignored, such as the estimated
costs of implementing an integrated network of community-based man-

94. Harvey and Coon, supra note 10 at 15, note a similar concern based on the lack of
preparation that seems to have gone into DFO's approach to co-management. See also
Canadian Council of Professional Fish Harvesters, supra note 58.
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agement organs, because they can await a demonstrated political interest
for the proposal.
1. Purposes (Section 2)
A purposes section serves as a normative reference point to which
decision-makers exercising authority under the CBMFA can refer, 95 and
on which adjudicators can rely in attempting to interpret the provisions
and procedures of the CBMFA. 96 It is particularly important in legislation
that is aimed at creating new administrative/management regimes and at
encouraging new ways of thinking about issues. As well, a purposes
section is justified where concrete objectives are sought within a flexible
framework, whose actual structure and procedure will be adapting as it
develops. Simply, it provides substantive guidelines against which to
97
hold decision-makers accountable.
Section 2 establishes a clear policy bias in favour of the development
of community-based management of fisheries within a common property
(as opposed to a private property) regime. 98 The management of Canada's
Atlantic fisheries is to be exercised to achieve the dual and inter-related
objectives of sustainable fisheries and sustainable communities.99 Management actions are to be informed by concerns for intra- and intergenerational equity, and are to direct fisher participation in decisionmaking and stewardship. Caution and an awareness of ecosystem

95. Perhaps atypically amongst environmental/resource management legislation, the CBMFA
seeks to limit the scope of discretion that can be exercised by decision-makers enabled by its
provisions. A purposes section accordingly provides necessary, susbstantive criteria that must
be respected in making decisions under the CBMFA. By structuring it so that the purposes of
the CBMFA provide a constant framework against which actions must be assessed, decisionmaking will be made more accountable to the specific objectives of the CBMFA. For an
example of ministerial discretion arguably subverting the unspecified intent of environmental
legislation, see Cantwell v. Canada (Minister of the Environment) (1991), 41 F.T.R. 18.
96. On the interpretive utility of clearly defined legislative objectives to adjudicators, see
E.A. Dreidger, Construction ofStatutes (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983) at 35-36.
97. See, e.g., T.M. Cloutier, "Conflicts of Interest on Regional Fisheries Management Councils: Corruption or Co-operative Management" (1996) 2 Ocean & Coastal L.J.
101 at 102, noting that the Regional Fisheries Management Councils established under the
U.S. federal Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (MFCMA)
16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1994) are perceived as corrupt and self-interested, due to a lack of
public oversight and adequate checks on authority.
98. Section 2(c) is intended to indicate that community-based management is not about
transferring ownership rights in either fish or territory to the communities. Rather it is about
delegating jurisdiction to manage local resources to those people who have the greatest
practical expertise and the most direct interest in their judicious use.
99. Harvey & Coon, supra note 10 at 27, note that government policy needs to meaningfully
recognize the historical inter-relationship between fishing communities and the fisheries.
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dynamics °'are to inform decision-making under the CBMFA.' 0 ' Express
references to the purposes of the CBMFA (e.g. sections 30, 40, 43, 44, 47
and 49) are to affirm that these policy objectives are intended to be
02
guiding principles throughout the administration of the Act.1
It is urged that the new policy direction expressed in section 2 can be
amply justified as being in the public interest. For instance, an estimated
1,300 communities in Atlantic Canada depend on the fisheries as the basis
of their livelihood, society and culture. 03 The small boat fisheries can
provide for three times more jobs than large trawlers, at a lower level of
investment per job."° Also, the economic health of other significant
industries (e.g., tourism) is directly dependent on the survival of coastal
communities in Atlantic Canada.'05 These justifications are in addition to
the benefits of a community-based management regime described in
Part II.
The general policy of the CBMFA would be consistent with Canada's
international obligations under Agenda 21,106 the global plan of action
adopted by the participants of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992. In particular,
para. 17.79 urges the parties to implement management strategies that are
particularly suited to the needs of small-scale fishers, and to take

100. S.M. Garcia, supra note 23 at 13, enumerates some of the aims and principles of
ecosystem management as:
minimizing conversion of critical ecosystems to "lower" conditions, compensating
habitat conversion with restoration (allowing no net loss), maintaining ecological
relationships, maintaining populations at greatest net annual increment, restoring
depleted populations, minimizing risk of irreversible change in the marine ecosystem,
etc.
101. Arguably, precaution is inherent in a community-based management approach. The
nature of a community's dependence on a fishery resource makes it risk averse, and willing to
forego present benefits for greater certainty of sustainable returns. See, e.g., McGoodwin,
supra note 6 at 179.
102. Another reason for emphasizing the purposes of the CBMFA is that although there
appears to exist a presumption that community-based management is inherently sustainable in
intent, due to the socio-economic dependency of communities on the fisheries, legislative
support for, and direction to that specific end is prudent in the absence of more widespread
empirical proof in the Canadian context. Such an approach is consistent with Pinkerton &
Weinstein, supra note 2 at 182, who emphasize that checks and balances are appropriate to
ensure sustainable use practices, until an ethic of stewardship is securely ingrained in the
community.
103. Harvey & Coon, supra note 10 at 41.
104. Coastal Communities News (Halifax), April 1997 at 4.
105. Coastal Communities News (Halifax), March 1996 at 10.
106. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Agenda 21:Programme
of Action for Sustainable Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/26, (New York: U.N.
Department of Public Information, 1993).
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legislative action in support of such strategies. Para. 17.82 is also
apposite, encouraging states to integrate small-scale fishers' concerns
into decision-making, and to promote the sustainability of their commu10 7
nities and fisheries.
In addition, the CBMFA would be promoting the objectives of Principle 22 of the Rio Declaration, 108 which declares that:
Indigenous people and their communities, and other local communities,

have a vital role in environmental management and development because
of their knowledge and traditional practices. States should recognize and
duly support their identity, culture and interests and enable their effective
participation in the achievement of sustainable development. [Emphasis
added.]"10
Finally, the CBMFA is consistent with Article 7 of the Food and
Agricultural Organization's Code of Conductfor Responsible Fisher-

ies." 0 The Code of Conduct emphasizes that sustainability of fisheries is
the primary management objective,' and that the interests of small-scale
fishers in particular need to be taken into account.12 Additionally, Article
7.5 encourages the adoption of a precautionary approach to fisheries
management, entailing an awareness of the uncertainties inherent in
14
fisheries management" I3 and a concordant need to be flexible. 4
2. Interpretation(Section 3)
In the interest of simplicity, the definition of "community" was restricted
to the territorial aspect.' 15Other important elements of a "community"such as commonality of management objectives and dependence on the
fisheries -that contribute to a successful community-based management

107. See U. Barg and U.N. Wijkstrom, "Environmental Management Options for Coastal
Fisheries and Aquaculture" (1994) 18 Marine Policy 127 at 133-34.
108. June 13, 1992, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/5/Rev. 1, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992).
109. But see D. VanderZwaag, Canadaand Marine EnvironmentalProtection:Chartinga
Legal Course Towards SustainableDevelopment (London: Kluwer Law International, 1995)
at 38-39, who criticizes Principle 22 for its vague and ambiguous terms, and for "stop[ping]
short of clear recognition of co-management or self-government commitments."
110. (Rome: FAO, 1992).
111. Ibid.,article7.1.1.
112. Ibid. See, e.g., articles 7.2.2(c) and 7.6.6.
113. Ibid., article 7.5.2.
114. Ibid., article 7.5.5.
115. See Jentoft and McCay, supra note 3 at 237-238, on the difficulties of defining
"community."
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regime have been integrated into the CBMFA in other ways (see section
2 and subsection 34(2)).
Also noteworthy in section 3 is the definition of "fisher," and its
exclusion of corporations. A "community" of corporations would be
presumptively inimical to the purposes of the CBMFA.
3. Atlantic FisheriesTribunal
Part I of the Act has been adopted, with only minor changes, from the
proposed FisheriesAct." 6 Under the FisheriesAct, the Atlantic Fisheries
Tribunal is intended to serve as an administrative adjudicator, and to take
over jurisdiction from the courts for the prosecution of fisheries violations. It also has been given the jurisdiction to hear appeals of the
Minister's rejection of a license application. 7
Under the CBMFA, the Tribunal has been given the critical responsibility of assessing the capacity of a fishers' organization to take on
fisheries management responsibilities on behalf of a community. Accordingly, section 9 requires that all Tribunal members have relevant
"expertise" to ensure informed decision-making, while section 19(a)
mandates that a three member panel consider and decide whether to
certify a Community Fisheries Management Board (CFMB). Section 33
is a standard privative clause, protecting decisions regarding certification
or decertificiation of CFMBs from judicial review. Finally, section 49
gives the Tribunal jurisdiction to hear complaints that decisions or
agreements authorized by the CBMFA have been inconsistent with the
Act's objectives.'

'8

If a new FisheriesAct is enacted, and an Atlantic Fisheries Tribunal is
thereby established, its mandate under the FisheriesAct can be readily
integrated with the mandate envisaged for it pursuant to the CBMFA.
Even if the Fisheries Act were to abandon the establishment of an
administrative sanctions body, the Tribunal, as represented in the CBMFA,
would have sufficient competence and guarantee of procedural fairness
to accomplish its assigned tasks.

116. See sections 66-89 of the proposed FisheriesAct.
117. Ibid., s. 90.
118. The U.S. experience with co-operative managment of fisheries under the MFCMA,
16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1994) suggests the need for judicial review of decision-makers to
ensure that their activities conform with the objectives of the legislation. See T.M. Cloutier,
supra note 97 at 125-127.
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4. Community FisheriesManagement Boards
The certification of a CFMB under section 30 is the first step in the
development of a successful community-based management regime. 19
The CBMFA establishes criteria that the Tribunal must assess in determining the validity of applications for certification. An ideal applicant
would be a democratically elected fishers' association, bound by a
constitution with guaranteed membership rights and responsibilities,
evidencing the unanimous support of all of the fishers active in a
traditionally recognized fishing area. An applicant meeting these criteria
would likely be able to enlist the widespread participation in decisionmaking and respect for those decisions that is necessary for efficient and
effective management. 20 The notion of an "appropriate fisheries management unit" in subsection 30(4)(c) is intended to encompass considerations of economies of scale, and the resource needs of multi-species
fishers. As well, considerations of those factors enumerated in subsections 34(2)(a) to (d) should inform the inquiry into what is an "appropriate
fisheries management unit." Undoubtedly, greater specificity would be
achieved as administrative experience is gained.
The combination of subsections 30(2) and 30(3) ensure that the
certification process is not used to make unjustifiable "power-grabs" by
competing fishers' organizations, or for incursions into fishing grounds
traditionally used by other fishers or informally managed by other
communities. For the sake of administrative simplicity, overlapping
CFMBs are prohibited by subsection 30(5). This will also preserve the
jurisdictional exclusivity required to ensure that the most complete
information on fishing effort, practices and catch levels is kept within the
CFMB, thereby enabling the most informed decision-making possible.
Representational exclusivity will also avoid potential conflicts of interest
in the event of disagreements between adjacent CFMBs.
Section 31 is central to creating an equitable management regime, and
is potentially the most contentious provision in the CBMFA. It has several
important ramifications. First, whether or not all of the individual fishers
support the association that applied for certification, once that association
is certified for the community, all fishers within that community are
deemed members of the CFMB, with an equal say in the development of
management rules. Second, combined with the effect of subsection 34(2),

119. The structure of the proposed management regime is very similar to the one proposed
by Harvey & Coon, supra note 10 at pp. 46-52, and is consistent with Jentoft and McCay, supra
note 3 at 243, where they advocate that biological realities should determine the level of
decision-making.
120. See A.T. Charles, supra note 30 at 70. See also Jentoft & McCay, supranote 3 at 244-45.
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every fisher who fishes within the CFMB's jurisdiction must abide by the
CFMB's rules. Permitting the co-existence of overlapping management
regimes, by allowing individual fishers to opt out, would weaken the
legitimacy of the CFMB and detract from the self-enforcing nature of
2
community-based management.' '
The decertification of a CFMB is intended to be an extreme remedy,
to be used in cases where a CFMB has persistently mismanaged its
responsibilities or otherwise lost its legitimacy. Ideally, both the democratic workings of a CFMB and its legal obligations under a fisheries
management agreement would act as checks on a CFMB to ensure
accountability. However,the option of decertification (section 32) should
also be available where a CFMB has demonstrated an incapacity or an
unwillingness to abide by its legal obligations. In addition, decertification
should be used to allow the growth, and/or realignment of CFMBs, in
accordance with the purposes of the CBMFA and section 30. Subsection
32(2)(d) recognizes that the development of a community-based management regime will be an incremental process, informed by trial and
error. Accordingly, the legislative structure must be flexible.
5. FisheriesManagement Agreements (Section 34)
The negotiation of a fisheries management agreement will be the principal method of establishing, between the Minister and a certified CFMB,
which management duties and responsibilities will be taken on by the
CFMB. Section 34(1) is evidence of the strong policy objective in the
CBMFA to promote community-based management of fisheries. The
Minister is directed to conclude a fisheries management agreement with
any fishers' organization that has been certified as a CFMB, so long as an
agreement can be reached that is consistent with the purposes of the
CBMFA. The only reason for which the Minister could refuse to delegate
real management authority to a CFMB is that a proposed agreement
would not promote the purposes of the CBMFA (i.e., that it would be
inconsistent with the achievement of sustainable fisheries or sustainable
fishing communities).
Subsection 34(2) serves several important functions. By necessitating
the delegation of exclusive management authority over a given area of the
sea, it attempts to promote the ability of a CFMB to manage its jurisdic-

121. A.T. Charles, supra note 30 at 70, warns against sector-based management within
community-based management because it would further institutionalize divisions amongst
fishers and reduce the capacity of communities to exercise moral suasion in favour of
compliance with the rules.
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tion with as complete information as possible .122 Where all activity within
a CFMB's jurisdiction is subject to its control, then ideally there are no
information gaps to weaken the feedback loop of decision-making, action
and reaction.
By granting exclusive jurisdiction to a CFMB, the CBMFA also
promotes the ecosystem approach to management. A management regime composed of multiple CFMBs, representing only single gear-types
or single species fisheries, will not be able to flourish. Prohibiting
overlapping jurisdictions, and preventing the escape of information from
the loop through outsiders fishing within a CFMB's jurisdiction, will
assist a CFMB to better understand and monitor the interacting behaviours
of multiple species. 123 As well, exclusive territorial jurisdiction will
for which exclusive representation is granted to
enhance the objectives
124
the CFMBs.
Finally, by mandating the delegation of exclusive jurisdiction over an
area of the sea, the Minister is forced to grant real authority to a CFMB.
Subsection 34(2) therefore shifts the balance of power in the negotiating
process to the CFMB. If a CFMB is to be given exclusive jurisdiction,
then the Minister must agree to the delegation of sufficient rights and
responsibilities to enable it to manage the fisheries in accordance with the
purposes of the CBMFA. Otherwise, the CBMFA is permissive on which
precise powers and duties will be delegated through a fisheries manage-25
ment agreement (subsection 34(3)), in order to allow for flexibility.
The full panoply of management tools, which can be effectively implemented at the community level and which are consistent with the
purposes of the CBMFA, will be available to a CFMB. Different CFMB's
will have different needs, ambitions and capacities, which should be
accommodated through the negotiation process .126
Violations of fisheries management agreements are to be accorded
differential treatment depending on who commits the infraction. If a nonmember of a CFMB illegally fishes in a CFMB's jurisdiction, then the

122. Harvey & Coon, supra note 10 at 47-49, stress the importance of complete information
for sustainable management plans and link it to the need for exclusive jurisdiction.
123. Ibid.
124. See note 121, and accompanying text.
125. T. Panayotou, supranote 13 at 40, advocates the need for flexibility in small-scale multispecies fisheries management, in order to make constant adjustments to respond to the
uncertain ecosystem inter-relationships. See also J.R. McGoodwin, supra note 6 at 180, who
emphasizes that flexibility is a crucial component of a community-based management regime,
both to take account of local variations in fisheries, as well as to allow adaptation to the
changing social, cultural and economic concerns of fishers.
126. See, e.g., Jentoft & McCay, supra note 3 at 244-45.
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fisher is to be prosecuted according to the FisheriesAct.' However, if
a member of the CFMB is accused of violating the fisheries management
agreement, then the decision whether to prosecute under the FisheriesAct
rests with the CFMB. Ideally, a fisheries management agreement would
allow a CFMB to enforce its own management rules through sanctions.
The stigma of being sanctioned by one's fellow fishers would promote
compliance. As well, the authority to sanction would enhance the
legitimacy of the CFMB. These are the objectives of subsection 38(2).
Finally, section 39 is a necessary protection for the integrity of
fisheries management agreements and the exclusive jurisdiction of
CFMBs.
6. BioregionalManagement Councils (Sections 40 to 46)
A higher-level management council is needed to undertake planning at an
ecosystem-wide level.1 2 8 The approach will differ from that of the
dominant management paradigm, which takes generalizations about
ecosystem functions and fishers behaviour and attempts to create regulations that force the particular to conform to the general. Instead, the
Bioregional Management Councils (BMCs) 1 29 will be informed by the
particular. The majority of the members of the BMCs will be representatives of the local-level CFMBs. Accordingly, the BMCs will serve the
management needs of the ecosystem, but be informed by the communitylevel management perspective.
Recognizing that initially, and perhaps perpetually, fisheries manage•ment in Atlantic Canada will remain a mixture of community-based and
state-controlled management, subsection 41(1)(b) mandates the participation of fishers on BMCs who fall outside the jurisdiction of any CFMB.
Ideally, the management regime will evolve so that all major fishing
activity occurs within the jurisdiction of a network of CFMBs 130 Unless

127. Whether such a prosecution would occur in provincial court or under the Tribunal
depends on whether the proposed FisheriesActeventuallybecomes law. See sections 91-120.
128. A.P. Lino Grima & F. Berkes, supra note 54 at 35, emphasize that the key to an
ecosystem approach to management is that the "resources" are treated not as "factors of
production," but are valued for the ecological functions that they serve.
129. Section 40 contains a list of proposed "bioregions." This list is not intended to be
immutable, and awaits input from those more knowledgeable about marine ecosystems in
Atlantic Canada.
130. J.F. Caddy, infra note 133 at 7, makes an important point about the difficulty of interjurisdictional cooperation where each jurisdiction shares fundamentally different management
values, e.g., management under an ITQ regime versus community-based management relying
on effort controls.
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and until that happens, the CBMFA is still fundamentally about ensuring
the meaningful participation of fishers in the decision-making process,
especially where they are to be subject to its regulatory authority (see
section 50). Accordingly, fishers who are not represented by a CFMB
deserve equally to have a role in the management of the fisheries.
In particular, a BMC will offer a forum to resolve conflicts between
competing CFMBs.3 1 As well, the BMCs will take an ecosystem-wide

approach to the management of fish stocks that migrate through more
than one CFMB jurisdiction.132 Such a management perspective is
necessary in order to avoid "gauntlet" fisheries, whereby a particular
stock is fished in different jurisdictions at different times in its life-cycle,
thus frustrating recruitment and an accurate understanding of stock
abundance.'33 To ensure that CFMB management practices are consistent
with the sustainability of fisheries beyond CFMB boundaries, section 43
combined with subsection 34(2) gives regulatory supremacy to the
BMCs over CFMB management rules. Also worthy of note, under section
44 a BMC can force two conflicting CFMBs to agree to, for instance ,joint
harvesting plans or the merging of jurisdiction for the harvesting of a
particular species.
Finally, a role is expressly reserved for DFO scientists on the BMCs .
Despite criticisms of the dominant management paradigm, and the
contribution of science to legitimizing that model, it is expected that
science will play a critical and irreplaceable role in ecosystem-wide
fisheries management. The difference is that the structure and objectives
of a community-based management regime will orient the scientists'
expertise to serve different ends.
7. Offshore FisheriesBoards (Sections 47 and 48)
Admittedly, little attention in this proposal has been reserved for offshore
fisheries management. The primary concern of the CBMFA is the
promotion of sustainable fisheries and sustainable fishing communities.

131. The United Sea Area Fisheries Adjustment Commissions of Japan play a similar role in
Japan's multi-layered fisheries management regime. See Ruddle, supra note 9 at 41. See also
Harvey & Coon, supra note 10 at 50-51.
132. Harvey & Coon, supra note 10 at 49.
133. See J.F. Caddy, Some ConsiderationsRelevant to the Definition of Shared Stocks and
TheirAllocation between Adjacent Economic Zones: FAO FisheriesCircularNo. 749 (Rome:
FAO, 1982) at 4. Although Caddy's report was addressed to the problems of fish stocks
straddling international boundaries, the report is apposite in this context.
134. Jentoft & McCay,supranote 3 at 241, suggest that the appropriate role for scientists on
a community-based management decision-making body is as a "supplement to rather than a
substitute for moral and practical knowledge and common sense."
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Accordingly, offshore fisheries management is made subject to these
dual purposes. The representation of the BMCs on the Offshore Fisheries
Boards (OFBs) ensures that the ecosystem-wide perspective, and the
concerns of the CFMBs, are taken into account in the development of
offshore fisheries management policies.'35 It is expected that circulation
and ongoing discussion of the CBMFA will lead to an expansion and
specification of the OFBs' structure and function.
Conclusion
The purpose of this proposal has been to indicate the need for a radical
change in the values and methods of fisheries management in Atlantic
Canada. The proposal has attempted to demonstrate the failures of the
traditional approach and to propose community-based management as an
alternative to the traditional approach, and to any other paradigmatic
managment philosophy (i.e., individual transferable quotas). In explaining how community-based management might be able to address these
deficiencies of knowledge input, regulatory specificity, and regulatory
legitimacy and compliance, this proposal has sought to justify the
development of legislation that would make community-based management of fisheries a central component of Canadian fisheries policy.
This structured and principled approach, firmly grounded in a policy
of promoting the sustainability of fisheries and fishing communities, is
sufficiently flexible to permit adjustments in the institutionalization
process, and to respond to the varied needs of different communities. At
the same time, the proposal contains the necessary checks and balances
to ensure that, on an ongoing basis, community-based management is
consistent with public policy objectives. It is hoped that this proposal will
receive serious attention, out of which might come a typically Canadian
consensus amongst government, the fishing communities and the greater
public, on how to fix our fisheries.

135.

Harvey & Coon, supra note 10 at 52.

The Community-Based Management of Fisheries in Atlantic Canada

ANNEX

............ Session .............. Parliam ent,
45 Elizabeth II, 199...

THE HOUSE OF COMMONS OF CANADA

BILL C-....
An Act respecting the community-based management of fisheries in
Atlantic Canada

First reading ...................

199...

80

The Dalhousie Law Journal

...... Session ...... th Parliament
45 Elizabeth II, 199...
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS OF CANADA
PROPOSED BILL C-...
An Act respecting the community-based management of fisheries in
Atlantic Canada
WHEREAS Canadians recognize the integral role which fisheries have played in the development of our country;
WHEREAS Canada desires to maintain the importance and
viability of the fishing industry in perpetuity, forthe benefit of present and
future generations;
WHEREAS Canada holds that conservation, based on an ecosystem approach, is of fundamental importance to maintaining biological
diversity and productivity in the marine environment;
WHEREAS Canada recognizes the need to promote a precautionary approach to the conservation, management and use of marine
resources, in order to protect these resources and preserve the marine
environment;
WHEREAS the conservation of Canada's fisheries and their
management on a sustainable basis are central to the livelihood of fishers
and the sustainability of fishing communities;
WHEREAS the sustainability of Canada's fishing communities
depends on equitable access to the fisheries by members of the present
generation, and as between the present and future generations;
WHEREAS fishers and their organizations wish to have a greater
role in the direct management of Canada's fisheries;
AND WHEREAS Canada recognizes that the principled delegation of fisheries management authority to community-based management organizations can achieve the sustained use of marine resources and
promote the sustainability of fishing communities;
NOW, THEREFORE, Her Majesty, by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate and House of Commons, enacts as follows:
SHORT TITLE

1. This Act may be cited as the Community-based Management of
FisheriesAct.
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PURPOSES

2. For greater certainty, the purpose of this Act is to facilitate the
delegation of management responsibilities to Community Fisheries
Management Boards, and equally
(a) to ensure the sustainability of Canada's fisheries through a
precautionary and ecosystem approach to the conservation, management and use of marine resources;
(b) to ensure the sustainability of Canada's fishing communities
through
(i) the proper management and stewardship of all marine resources, and
(ii) the promotion of equitable access to, and participation in the
control of the fisheries by present and future fishers; and
(c) to recognize that Canada's fisheries are the common property of
all present and future Canadians, and therefore to manage those
resources for the maximum benefits of all.
INTERPRETATION

3. In this Act,
"community" means all fishers who reside in a geographically defined
area;
"conservation" means the protection of a species and its habitat to ensure
the ability of the species to propagate itself indefinitely;
"Department" means the Department of Fisheries and Oceans;
"fish"
(a) where used as a noun, includes
(i) parts of fish,
(ii) shellfish, crustaceans, other marine animals, and any parts
thereof, and
(iii) the eggs, sperm, spawn, larvae, spat and juvenile stages of
fish, shellfish, crustaceans and other marine animals, and
(b) where used as a verb, means catch or attempt to catch fish;
"fisher" means a person engaged in fishing, and for greater certainty, does
not include corporations
"fishers' organization" means an organization representing fishers'

82

The Dalhousie Law Journal

"fishery" means a fishery described in terms of
(a) a species of fish,
(b) a place where fishing may be carried on,
(c) a particular method of fishing, or
(d) a particular type of fishing gear or equipment or vessel used;
"Minister" means the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans;
"precautionary approach" means erring on the side of caution in favour
of the environment where there is uncertainty as to the risk of serious or
irreversible environmental damage;
"sustainability" means maintaining the viability of resources in order to
meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs.
HER MAJESTY

4. This Act is binding on Her Majesty in right of Canada or a province.
TERRITORIAL OPERATION

5. This Act applies, in addition to its application to Canada,
(a) to the exclusive economic zone of Canada;
(b) in respect of sedentary species, to the continental shelf of
Canada; and
(c) to Canadian fishing vessels and Canadian citizens on any area of
the sea other than an area of the sea that forms part of the territorial
sea or internal waters of another state.

PART I
ATLANTIC FISHERIES TRIBUNAL
ESTABLISHMENT

6. There is hereby established a tribunal, to be known as the Atlantic
Fisheries Tribunal, consisting of a full-time Chairperson and any parttime members, all appointed by the Governor in Council.
7. (1) The Chairperson is the chief executive officer of the Tribunal.
(2) If the Chairperson is absent or unable to act or if the office of
Chairperson is vacant, such other member of the Tribunal as is designated
by the Governor in Council shall perform the functions of the Chairperson.
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8. (1) The members of the Tribunal shall be appointed to hold office
during good behaviour for a term not exceeding three years, but may be
removed by the Governor in Council at any time for cause.
(2) A member may be re-appointed to the Tribunal.
9. A person is not eligible to be appointed as a member unless the person
has expertise about Canada's fisheries resources and is knowledgeable
about administrative decision-making.
10. (1) A person is not eligible to be appointed or to continue as a
member if the person is, directly or indirectly, as owner, shareholder,
director, officer, partner or otherwise, engaged in a fisheries business or
undertaking or is a member of, or the holder of an office in, a fishers'
organization, a Community Fisheries Management Board, a Bioregional
Management Council, or the Offshore Fisheries Board.
(2) A member who becomes engaged in the manner referred to in
subsection (1) by will or succession shall become disengaged within
ninety days after becoming so engaged.
11. Members shall not accept or hold any office or employment inconsistent with their functions under this Act.
12. The Chairperson of the Tribunal shall be paid such remuneration and
allowances as are fixed by the Governor in Council, and each other
member is entitled to be paid such fees for that other member's services
as are fixed by the Governor in Council.
13. If a person who is engaged as a member in respect of any matter
ceases to be a member before rendering a decision in respect of the matter,
the person may, with the authorization of the Chairperson of the Tribunal,
continue, during a period not exceeding one hundred and eighty days, to
act as a member in respect of the matter.
14. (1) The secretary and other staff necessary for the proper conduct of
the business of the Tribunal shall be appointed in accordance with the
Public Service Employment Act.
(2) The Tribunal may engage and, subject to the approval of the
Treasury Board, fix the remuneration of persons having technical or
special knowledge to assist or advise the Tribunal in any matter.
15. In performing its functions, the Tribunal shall, where appropriate,
make use of the services and facilities of departments, boards and
agencies of the Government of Canada.
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16. (1) The members and the secretary and other staff referred to in
section 14 are not personally liable for anything done or omitted to be
done in good faith in performing any functions under this Act.
(2) Subsection (1) does not, by reason of section 10 of the Crown
Liability andProceedingsAct, relieve the Crown of liability in respect of
a tort to which the Crown would otherwise be subject.
17. The Tribunal is an agent of Her Majesty in right of Canada for the
purposes of the law of contract.
18. The Tribunal, its members and the secretary and other staff referred
to in section 14 are servants of Her Majesty in right of Canada for the
purposes of the law of tort.
19. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal shall be exercised,
(a) in certifying a Community Fisheries Management Board, by
three members of the Tribunal assigned by the Chairperson of the
Tribunal to that case, and the order made by the members is an order
of the Tribunal, and
(b) in any other case, by a single member of the Tribunal assigned
by the Chairperson of the Tribunal to that case, and the order made
by the member is an order of the Tribunal.
20. All parties to a proceeding before the Tribunal may appear in person
or may be represented by counsel or by an agent.
21. All proceedings before the Tribunal shall be open to the public.
22. (1) The Tribunal may summon any person to appear as a witness
before it and may order the witness to
(a) give evidence orally or in writing; and
(b) produce any documents and things that the Tribunal
considers necessary or desirable for the purpose of performing any of its
functions.
23. (2) A witness who is served with a summons under subsection (1) is
entitled to receive the fees and allowances to which persons who are
summoned to appear as witnesses before the Federal Court are entitled.
24. (1) Any summons to a witness issued or order made by the Tribunal
may be made a summons to a witness or an order of the Federal Court or
of the superior court of a province and is enforceable in the same manner
as a summons to a witness or an order of that court.
(2) To make a summons or an order of the Tribunal a summons or an
order of the Federal Court or of the superior court of a province, the usual

The Community-Based Management of Fisheries in Atlantic Canada

practice and procedure of the court in such matters may be followed, or
the secretary of the Tribunal may file a certified copy of the summons or
order with the registrar of the court and the summons or order thereupon
becomes a summons or an order of the court.
25. The Tribunal may review and confirm, rescind or vary any decision
or order made by it.
26. The Tribunal shall publish its decisions and orders in the manner it
sees fit.
27. (1) For greater certainty, subject to section 33 of this Act, the Federal
Court has jurisdiction under section 18.1 of the Federal Court Act to hear
and determine an application for judicial review in which relief is sought
against the Tribunal.
(2) The Tribunal is entitled to be heard by counsel or otherwise on
the argument of an application referred to in subsection (1).
28. The Tribunal may make by-laws respecting the calling of meetings
of the Tribunal, the conduct of business at meetings of the Tribunal and
the internal administrative affairs of the Tribunal.
29. The Tribunal may, with the approval of the Governor in Council,
make rules governing its practice and procedure.
PART II
COMMUNITY FISHERIES MANAGEMENT
BOARDS
CERTIFICATION

30. (1) An application may be made to the Tribunal for the certification
of a fishers' organization as a Community Fisheries Management Board.
(2) Before an application can be made, notice of it shall be given to
(a) fishers of the community in respect of which the application
is being made, and
(b) fishers of adjacent communities.
(3) Any interested party shall be entitled to make submissions to the
Tribunal on issues relevant to the certification application.
(4) An application shall be granted if, in the opinion of the Tribunal,
the application satisfies the following criteria:
(a) the fishers' organization is representative of the community;
(b) the fishers' organization is bound by a constitution which is
based on democratic principles so that
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(i) every member of the community has a vote in electing
representatives, and
(ii) there exist mechanisms to ensure participatory decisionmaking by the members;
(c) the geographic region comprising the community is an
appropriate fisheries management unit, having regard to the
purposes of the Act;
(d) the fishers' organization has the capacity to take on management responsibilities, in furtherance of the purposes of the Act;
and
(e) the application is consistent with the purposes of the Act.
(5) Subject to subsection 32(2)(d), the Tribunal shall not certify as
a Community Fisheries Management Board any fishers' organization
claiming to represent a community already represented, in whole or in
part, by another Community Fisheries Management Board.
EFFECTS OF CERTIFICATION

31. (1) All members of the community for which the Community
Fisheries Management Board has been certified shall be deemed equal
members of that Community Fisheries Management Board.
(2) Nothing in this Act shall be taken to abrogate or derogate in any
way from existing aboriginal treaty or other rights.
DECERTIFICATION

32. (1) Any interested party may apply to the Tribunal to decertify a
Community Fisheries Management Board, within three months prior to
the termination of a fisheries management agreement.
(2) In deciding whether to decertify a Community Fisheries Management Board, the Tribunal shall have regard to
(a) the level of community support for the application,
(b) whether the Community Fisheries Management Board has
acted inconsistently with the purposes of the Act, and the terms
of the fisheries management agreement, and;
(c) the ability of the applicant to otherwise enforce the terms of
the Community Fisheries Management Board's constitution or
the fisheries management agreement,
or whether
(d) a more appropriate Community Fisheries Management Board
has been proposed under section 30.
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33. All decisions of the Tribunal concerning certification and decertification are final and conclusive, and not subject to question or review.
FISHERIES MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS

34. (1) Her Majesty in right of Canada, represented by the Minister, shall
enter into a fisheries management agreement with any Community
Fisheries Management Board, if the fisheries management agreement is
consistent with the purposes of the Act.
(2) An agreement shall establish, subject to subsection 35 of the
OceansAct, subsection 21 of the FisheriesAct, and subsection 43 and 44
of this Act, the area of the sea in which a Community Fisheries Management Board shall have exclusive management authority over fisheries,
having regard to
(a) the relative proximity of the area of the sea to the community,
(b) the historical linkages between the community and the area
of the sea,
(c) the economic dependence of the community on the area of
the sea, and
(d) any competing claims to the area, based on proximity,
historical use and economic dependency, by fishers who are not
members of the Community Fisheries Management Board.
(3) An agreement may establish
(a) harvest limits, and other conservation and management
measures for a fishery;
(b) conditions for access to a fishery;
(c) the obligations, responsibilities and funding arrangements
with respect to the management of a fishery;
(d) conservation and management programmes for a fishery;
(e) authority for the Community Fisheries Management Board
to conclude binding agreements with other persons or bodies,
including other Community Fisheries Management Boards;
(f) any other matters necessary to ensure an agreement is
consistent with the purposes of the Act.
35. Upon the request of either party, the Tribunal may appoint a facilitator to assist in the conclusion of a fisheries management agreement.
36. The Minister shall publish a fisheries management agreement in the
Gazette.
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EFFECTS OF AGREEMENT

37. (1) An agreement is binding between the parties, and has the force
of law against all other persons with notice of it.
(2) A person is deemed to have notice of a fisheries management
agreement once it has been published in the Gazette.
38. (1) Violations of fisheries management agreements shall be prosecuted as if they were violations of the FisheriesAct.
(2) Violations of a fisheries management agreement by members of
the Community Fisheries Management Board covered by the fisheries
management agreement, shall not be prosecuted pursuant to the Fisheries
Act without the consent of that Community Fisheries Management
Board.
39. In the event of an inconsistency between a term of a fisheries
management agreement and a regulation or a provision of a regulation
made pursuant to the FisheriesAct, the fisheries management agreement
shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency.
PART III
BIOREGIONAL MANAGEMENT COUNCILS
ESTABLISHMENT

40. There are hereby established Bioregional Management Councils for
the following bioregions:
(a) Bay of Fundy,
(b) Scotia Shelf
(c) Gulf of St. Lawrence, and
(d) Newfoundland,
whose mandates are to ensure that management measures within the
bioregion are consistent with the purposes of the Act, and in particular
with subsection 2(a).
41. (1) A Bioregional Management Council shall be comprised of:
(a) representatives from each of the Community Fisheries Management Boards within its jurisdiction;
(b) persons representing fishers operating within its jurisdiction
who are not represented by a Community Fisheries Management
Board, and;
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(c) fisheries managers and technical advisors appointed by the
Governor in Council.
(2) The representatives under subsection (1)(b) shall be elected by
the fishers within the jurisdiction of the Bioregional Management Councils who are not members of a Community Fisheries Management Board.
(3) The representatives of the Community Fisheries Management
Boards and the persons referred to in susbection (2) shall comprise a
majority of the voting members of a Bioregional Management Council.
42. The Minister may appoint to the Bioregional Management Council
such non-voting members as she/he sees fit, to represent the broader
public interest.
43. (1) In furtherance of its mandate and the purposes of the Act, a
Bioregional Management Council may make regulations, and in particular, but without limiting the generality of the foregoing, may make
regulations prescribing, within its region,
(a) gear restrictions;
(b) area closures;
(c) closed seasons; and
(d) minimum fish size limits.
(2) A regulation made pursuant to subsection (1) shall be published
in the Gazette and is binding on every person who has notice of it.
(3) A person is deemed to have notice of a regulation once it has been
published in the Gazette.
(4) A violation of a regulation made pursuant to subsection (1) shall
be prosecuted as if it was a violation of the FisheriesAct.
44. In order to further the purposes of the Act, a Bioregional Management
Council may establish binding conditions for an agreement between two
or more Community Fisheries Management Boards.
45. (1) A Bioregional Management Council shall establish and appoint
members to the Scientific Committee and the Management Committee.
(2) The Scientific Committee shall develop, collect, and evaluate
relevant biological, social, economic and other scientific information
relevant to the mandate of the Bioregional Management Council and the
objectives of the Act, and shall make recommendations to the Bioregional
Management Council on the exercise of its powers.
(3) The Management Committee shall develop, collect, and evaluate
information on management needs, experiences and practices relevant to
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the mandate of the Bioregional Management Council and the objectives
of the Act, and shall make recommendations to the Bioregional Management Council on the exercise of its powers.
46. In the exercise of its mandate, a Bioregional Management Council
shall
(a) gather, compile, analyze, coordinate and disseminate information; and
(b) consult with the Minister, other ministers, boards and agencies of
the Government of Canada, with provincial and territorial governments and with affected aboriginal organizations, fishing communities and other persons and bodies, including Community Fisheries
Management Boards, Bioregional Management Councils and the
Offshore Fisheries Board.
PART IV
OFFSHORE FISHERIES BOARD
ESTABLISHMENT

47. (1) There is hereby established the following Offshore Fisheries
Boards, whose mandate is to pursue fisheries management in accordance
with the purposes of the Act, in that area of the Exclusive Economic Zone
which is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Bioregional Management Councils.
(a) [list appropriate OFBs based on geography/economic
activity]
(2) The Offshore Fisheries Boards shall be comprised of representatives of corporations, representatives of fishers' organizations whose
membership works in the offshore industry, fisheries managers and
technical advisors appointed by the Governor in Council, and representatives of the Bioregional Management Councils.
(3) The Minister may appoint to the Offshore Fisheries Boards such
non-voting members as she/he sees fit, to represent the broader public
interest.
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48. (1) The Offshore Fisheries Boards may make regulations for carrying out the management of offshore fisheries and in particular, but
without limiting the generality of the foregoing, may make regulations
prescribing
(a) monitoring and reporting requirements;
(b) gear restrictions;
(c) area or seasonal closures;
(d) minimum fish size limits; and
(e) conditions for the issuance of permits.
REVIEW

49. Any interested party may apply to the Tribunal for an order quashing
any agreement, any provision of any agreement, or any regulation or
direction made under Part II, III and IV of this Act, on the grounds that
it is inconsistent with the purposes of this Act.
SUPREMACY OF REGULATIONS

50. Any regulation made under this Act which is inconsistent with any
regulation or provision of any regulation under the FisheriesAct, shall
prevail to the extent of the inconsistency.

